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This essay attempts to quantify and explain the economic performance of Australia 
from the first European settlement to the present, and beyond. A general dynamic 
theory – the ‘dynamic-strategy’ theory – has been employed to provide a new 
interpretation of ‘dynamics Downunder’. It is shown, among other things, that the 
bold attempt from the 1910s to the 1960s to turn aside from the traditional 
development policy of exogenously driven natural-resource exploitation in order to 
embark on an endogenously determined dynamic process, has broken down during the 
course of the present generation. This was mainly due to a failure of ‘strategic 
leadership’ on the part of recent Australian governments that have, quite rightly, 
dismantled the framework of protection, but have failed to replace it with the 
infrastructure of strategically relevant technological ideas. Once again Australia’s 
economic prosperity depends heavily on the fluctuating fortunes of the global 
economy. While in the nineteenth century this took the form of reliance on the 
prosperity of Britain, today it centres on the continuing growth of Japan and China. 
This critical problem has been exacerbated by the misconceived policy of inflation 
targeting that is damaging the central endogenous dynamic mechanism. What then of 
the future? It all depends on whether strategic leadership can ever be rediscovered, 
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Australia has an unparalleled history of successful societal dynamics, stretching back 
some 60,000 years. For most of this vast period of time, Aboriginal society was able 
to remain dynamic and viable – a remarkable achievement that I have attempted to 
explain elsewhere (Snooks 2006b). Nevertheless, with European settlement, the 
dynamics of Australian society was transformed. For the first time Australia 
experienced intense external competition generated by a world undergoing the 
Industrial Revolution. From 1788 Australian society, like all open societies, became 
obsessed with wealth and progress, and with recording their material achievement. 
From that time it was possible to estimate with considerable precision the extent of 
Australia’s wealth and the pace of its material progress – a task undertaken by a long 
line of pioneering Australian statisticians and historical economists, such as W.C. 
Wentworth (1819 and 1821), Timothy Coghlan (1886–1902), J.T. Sutcliffe (1926), 
Stanley Carver (1927), F.C. Benham (1928), Colin Clark and J.G. Crawford (1938), 
Noel Butlin (1962; 1986), Graeme Snooks (1972; 1974; 1994), Gus Sinclair (1988; 
1996), and Bryan Haig (2001).  
While this local tradition of historical economics is quantitative and analytical, 
it is not theoretical in nature (Snooks 1993: 139–61; 1994: 259–64). Considerable 
effort has gone into sketching the longrun patterns of wealth and progress, but no 
attempt has been made to explain these patterns by employing a realist general 
dynamic theory. The more economically literate historians have employed the ad hoc 
tools of orthodox economics – classical, Keynesian, and neoclassical – to relieve the 
tedium of quantitative description. But, none has been tempted to draw upon the so-
called neoclassical growth theory, even though one of its pioneers was the Australian 
economist Trevor Swan (1956). Perhaps this was fortunate, as deductive neoclassical 
theory can tell us little about the dynamics of real societies (Snooks 1998b: 25–49). 
In this essay an attempt is made to explain Australia’s longrun pattern of 
dynamics by employing a realist general dynamic theory – the ‘dynamic-strategy 
theory’. This theory, which is a product of Australian experience, has been arrived at 
inductively by the long-term and systematic observation of living systems in both the 
human and non-human worlds (Snooks 1996; 1997; 1998a; 1998b; 1999; 2000; 2003; 
2006). It is a transdisciplinary theory that is gaining recognition throughout the life 
sciences, in journals such as Complexity (at the Santa Fe Institute) and Advances in 
Space Research (Snooks 2008a; 2005). 
 
 
2. A New Dynamic Theory 
 
To understand the patterns of societal dynamics in the longrun, we require a new 
dynamic theory. The old theories, unlike the dynamic patterns, tell a story of selective 
comparative statics. To tell the story of Australia over the past two centuries, we need 
a truly dynamic theory. For this purpose the dynamic-strategy theory will be briefly 
outlined by focusing on its central features: the driving force; the dynamic 
mechanism; strategic demand and strategic confidence; the strategic demand-response 
mechanism; and strategic leadership in the theoretical Dynamic Society. 
   2
2.1 The driving force 
 
The endogenous driving force in the Dynamic Society is the competitive struggle of 
‘materialist man’ to survive and prosper. This is the major outcome of our 
biologically determined desires – what I call ‘strategic desire’ – that have been shaped 
by genetic change over almost 4,000 million years (myrs). In the dynamic-strategy 
model, as in life, ideas are an effective way of achieving our desires, but they do so in 
a passive way. In the longrun, as we will see, ideas respond to ‘strategic demand’. 
Two major implications emerge from this reality: altruism is not a prime determinant 
of human behaviour; and the decision-making process is not dominated by 
neoclassical rationality. The origin, evolution, and nature of strategic desire and 
human nature have been explored in considerable depth in my recent book The 
Selfcreating Mind (2006a).  
If ideas do not drive society, but merely facilitate the desires of its members, 
we need to replace the neoclassical rationality model of decision-making with a realist 
model. Through the inductive method it is possible to derive such a model, which I 
have called the ‘strategic-imitation model’ (Snooks 1996: 212–13; 1997: 36–46). In 
reality, decision-making is based on the need to economise on nature’s scarcest 
resource – intelligence. Rather than collect vast quantities of information on a large 
range of alternatives for processing through a mental model of the way the world 
works, the great majority of decision-makers – whom I call the ‘strategic followers’ – 
merely imitate those innovative people (‘strategic pioneers’) and projects that are 
conspicuously successful. The only information they require is that necessary to 
answer the key questions: Who and what is materially successful and why? Hence, the 
basic information required by decision-makers is the relatively inexpensive ‘imitative 
information’, not the prohibitively expensive benefit-cost information. Even the 
leading decision-makers – the strategic pioneers – do not employ rationalist 
techniques when seeking new ways of exploiting strategic opportunities. Rather than 
exhaustively seeking out the best investment projects, they believe their investment 
projects are best. It is the market that adjudicates. 
 
2.2 The Dynamic Mechanism 
 
The endogenous driving force of strategic desire is a self-starting and self-sustaining 
force that drives a dynamic mechanism, which has at its centre the ‘strategic pursuit’ – 
the pursuit of a dominant dynamic strategy. It is through the strategic pursuit that the 
objective of survival and prosperity is achieved. This dynamic strategy begins as an 
individual or family activity which, if successful, is adopted by wider social groups, at 
first local, then regional, and, finally, national. This takes place through the 
mechanism of strategic imitation, whereby successful pioneering initiatives are 
imitated by a growing number of individuals and groups. In this way, a successful 
dynamic strategy becomes the focus of political policies controlled by ruling 
strategists, or ‘strategic leaders’. The role of ‘strategic leadership’ is discussed below. 
The choice of dynamic strategy – from four possibilities including family-
multiplication (procreation and migration), conquest, commerce, and technological 
change – depends on the underlying economic conditions, such as factor endowments 
and the nature of external competition. It is a choice made by strategists who invest 
time and resources in alternative dynamic strategies. The important point to realise is 
that investment in these various strategies is undertaken for the same objective – 
survival and prosperity – and involves a broadly similar process, which is the strategic   3
pursuit. The main difference is that investment in family-multiplication, conquest, and 
commerce is undertaken in order to achieve economic growth by gaining control of 
new external resources, while technological change is used to achieve economic 
growth by effecting greater efficiency in the use of existing internal resources. As far 
as the strategist is concerned – in contrast to the orthodox economist – there is nothing 
special about technological change. After all, Roman economic growth over a period 
of 1,000 years was generated knowingly through the systematic pursuit of conquest, 
not technological change. Technological change, like the other three dynamic 
strategies, is just an instrument in the more general strategic pursuit. Similarly, within 
the context of a particular dynamic strategy, strategists attempt to gain a competitive 
advantage through the adoption of new substrategies which, where successful, 
generate new ‘technological styles’. 
As individuals and governments seek to exploit their physical and societal 
environments, setting in train a mass movement orchestrated through strategic 
imitation, the dominant dynamic strategy unfolds. Unfolds in the sense that its 
material opportunities are progressively exploited and, finally, exhausted. And it is 
this unfolding dynamic strategy (or substrategy) that shapes the expectations of 
decision-makers. The eventual exhaustion of a dynamic strategy is the outcome of the 
‘law of diminishing strategic returns’, whereby the revenue and costs of strategies 
rather than factors of production are finally equated (Snooks 1998a: 202–03). The 
resulting ‘rise and fall’ of dynamic strategies and substrategies traces out a distinctive 
wave-like pathway (see Figure 4), which provides the dynamic form for this model. 
This supersedes the arbitrary dynamic forms – the equilibrium growth path and the 
bifurcated pathways – adopted by supply-side neoclassical, evolutionary, and 
complexity growth theorists. A meaningful dynamic form cannot be deduced logically 
from supply-side assumptions about society. It is an existential concept, not an 
optimising concept. 
From historical observation, however, we can derive a general dynamic form 
that encompasses a series of wave-like surges in economic development and growth 
that are separated by intervals of stability or retreat. This sequence consists of ‘great 
waves’ of about 300 years in duration and, within these, ‘long waves’ of about 30–60 
years. The great waves are generated by the exploitation and exhaustion of dynamic 
strategies (for example, the present industrial technological strategy) and the long 
waves by a series of substrategies (for example, the pioneering phase of the Industrial 
Revolution in Britain, 1780–1830). We should focus, however, on the underlying 
dynamic mechanism rather than the precise wave-like pattern, because exogenous 
shocks continually distort the latter. These wave-like surges should not be thought of 
as part of a dynamic ‘cycle’, because the intervals between them are not 
systematically related to the surges of development before and after. Each of these 
intervals constitutes a hiatus that follows the exhaustion of a dynamic strategy (or 
substrategy) during which the strategists search desperately for a replacement strategy 
(or substrategy). The best recent example of such a strategic hiatus is Japan during the 
1990s and early 2000s. If the strategists are successful the strategic sequence will 
continue but, if not, the sequence will terminate and the society will eventually 
collapse. The latter ultimately occurred in all ancient societies. 
. 
2.3 Strategic Demand and Strategic Confidence 
 
The unfolding dynamic strategy, driven by the competitive energy of strategic desire 
(‘materialist man’), plays a central role in the dynamic-strategy model. Not only does   4
it provide the model with a realistic dynamic form, but it gives rise to two new 
concepts in economics – ‘strategic confidence’ and ‘strategic demand’. These 
concepts explain not only the dynamics of long-run investment and saving that are left 
hanging in orthodox comparative-static macroeconomics, but also how ‘dynamic 
order’ (usually called spontaneous order) is generated. It is the exploration of the 
demand side of dynamics that makes the dynamic-strategy theory unique in a world of 
supply-side theories, not only in economics and the other social sciences, but also in 
biology and physics (Snooks 2008). 
Strategic confidence, which rises and falls with the dominant dynamic strategy 
and its various substrategies, explains the changing investment climate in the 
Dynamic Society. It provides, for example, a dynamic explanation for Keynes’ ‘state 
of long-term expectation’. Accordingly it plays a central role in determining the 
willingness of strategists to invest, because of its influence on the longrun expected 
rate of return, and in the creation of dynamic order (through encouraging cooperation 
and an orderly institutional structure). Confidence and expectations rise as the 
dynamic strategy unfolds, and they decline, stagnate, and may even collapse as it is 
progressively exhausted. Strategic confidence also binds society together. 
Strategic demand – or dynamic demand – also waxes and wanes with the 
dominant dynamic strategy or substrategy. It comprises the effective demand 
exercised by decision-makers for a wide range of physical, intellectual, and 
institutional inputs required in the strategic pursuit. In exploiting expanding strategic 
opportunities, entrepreneurs need to invest in new infrastructure; to purchase 
intermediate goods and services; to employ labour skills; to acquire, renovate, or 
construct the necessary buildings, machinery, and equipment; to engage professional 
expertise; and to develop new facilitating social rules and organizations. Strategic 
demand, therefore, is the central active principle in our demand-side model. Naturally 
the supply responses of population change, capital formation, technological change, 
and institutional transformation, which are influenced by changes in relative prices, 
will contribute to the way in which strategic opportunities are exploited; but they do 
so passively. This concept turns Say’s Law – which was accepted explicitly by the 
classical economists and implicitly by neoclassical economists – on its head: in the 
Dynamic Society, dynamic demand creates its own supply. 
 
2.4 The Strategic Demand-Supply Response 
 
With the dynamic-strategy model we can shift focus from comparative-static 
macroeconomics to longrun dynamics by considering the interaction between strategic 
demand and the response of the supply-side variables. It is this interaction that causes 
the dynamic strategy to unfold and, hence, gives rise to the dynamic form of our 
model, and to the dynamic role played by strategic inflation in facilitating the supply 
response. ‘Strategic inflation’ is the widespread increase in prices resulting from the 
pressure of strategic demand on resources, commodities, and ideas. With the 
introduction of a new dynamic strategy/substrategy, the resulting expansion of 
strategic demand will lead to an increase in prices of key inputs, but will not generate 
strategic inflation until the new strategy exerts widespread influence throughout a 
given society. Economic growth of a traditional and unadventurous (that is, 
nonstrategic) kind that occurs within the context of known and available resources 
(such as in Australian during the past decade), may not lead to much inflation at all. 
But this nonstrategic growth will not last for long. ‘Nonstrategic inflation’, on the   5
other hand, is the increase of prices resulting from errors in monetary policy and the 
action of monopolies in either factor or commodity markets at home and abroad.  
Herein lie the major differences between strategic theory and orthodox theory. 
In neoclassical economics the supply side is, by default, treated as the active force in 
society (supply creates its own demand), which has no place for strategic inflation; 
while in Keynesian economics the supply-side variables are merely assumed to be 
given and ‘effective demand’ is a comparative-static, national-accounting concept. By 
contrast, in the dynamic-strategy model, strategic demand provides the active force to 
which the supply-side variables respond according to their supply costs. Strategic 
inflation, which provides the incentive system in this strategic demand-response 
mechanism, is a stable, non-accelerating function of economic growth. This 
theoretical relationship can be (and has been) estimated in the form of the ‘growth-
inflation curve’ over all timeframes – including the very longrun (past 1,000 years), 
the longrun (past 100 years), and shortrun (1960s–1990s). These growth-inflation 
curves are estimated and discussed in Snooks (1998b: 151–59). Inflation targeting, 
where this constrains strategic inflation (as it invariably does), distorts strategic 
signals and acts as a brake on the unfolding dynamic strategy. To eliminate strategic 
inflation in the longrun is to eliminate economic growth. 
Population, labour supply, capital formation, and technological and 
institutional ideas all respond to the unfolding dynamic strategy. Changes in these 
supply-side variables, both in terms of composition and growth rates, are a function of 
changing strategic opportunities. These variables expand and become more complex 
as the dominant dynamic strategy is exploited; and they stagnate, decline, and lose 
purpose, as the dynamic strategy is progressively exhausted and marginal strategic 
returns decline. Rapidly rising and falling prices form the catalyst for these dynamic 
developments. Naturally, supply-side costs play a role in shaping the strategic 
response, but this is a passive rather than an active role. Difficulties of supply are met 
by substitution of other resources, by investment in new human capital, and/or by 
innovation. In this way the supply-side variables are treated endogenously in the 
dynamic-strategy model. Dynamic demand creates its own supply. 
 
2.5 The Role of Strategic Leadership 
 
Strategic leadership, which is also a response to strategic demand, is essential to the 
survival and prosperity of human society. It was the primary reason for the emergence 
of government at the dawn of civilization and for its extension and maintenance ever 
since. Basically it involves facilitating the objectives of society’s dynamic strategists 
by coordinating their efforts, directly through government directives and incentives, 
and indirectly through cultural institutions such as religion, ideology, and the arts. In 
particular the strategic state provides basic infrastructure required by the unfolding 
dynamic strategy that is beyond the risk threshold and financial resources of 
individuals and corporations; it negotiates political and commercial deals with other 
societies; it protects the dynamic strategy at home and abroad; it encourages the 
emergence of new strategies during recessions/depressions; and it provides basic 
facilities for education, training, and research required to nourish the long-term health 
of the prevailing dynamic strategy, whether it be conquest, commerce, or 
technological change. This is a proactive rather than a passive role, and it is 
undertaken by the representatives of the strategists for the benefit of the strategists 
(Snooks 1997: 54–8; 2000: 57–111).    6
It is important to realise that the strategists do not necessarily encompass the 
entire population of a society. They include only those individuals who invest in the 
dominant dynamic strategy, either in physical or human-capital terms. The proportion 
of the population that can be classified as being among the strategists has varied 
throughout human history, not in a linear but in a circular way (Snooks 1997: chpt 3). 
In Palaeolithic (hunter-gatherer) society, almost 100 percent of adult members were 
actively involved in the family-multiplication strategy (for example, Aboriginal 
Australia). Hence, family and tribal leaders had to take into consideration the 
aspirations of all adults. By contrast, in Neolithic (agricultural) societies, only a small 
proportion of the population was actively engaged in the strategic pursuit, while the 
great majority were nonstrategists, being deprived of their liberty by the ruling elite. 
The proportion of strategists in the population ranged from less than 1 percent in 
conquest societies (for example, Anglo-Norman England) to about one-quarter in 
commerce societies (ancient Greece or medieval Venice). Only in advanced 
technological societies has the strategist/population ratio once more approached that 
of hunter/gatherer societies. This was an important social benefit that the original 
Australians had over the British invaders in 1788. 
Curiously the close historical relationship between dynamic strategists and 
their leaders has, since the 1970s, broken down in the modern world. And with this 
breakdown of strategic leadership, governments have neglected modern technological 
dynamic strategies in favour of military adventurism. Neoliberal economics, which 
sees no role for strategic leadership in its comparative-static world, has played a major 
role in this breakdown through its monopoly over economic advice (Snooks 2000: 
chpts 4 & 5). 
 
3. Economic Performance from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twenty-First      
   Centuries 
 
The new industrial technology from Western Europe transformed dynamics 
Downunder. It shattered the Aboriginal dynamic system, laid down a more productive 
process of economic expansion, and introduced the entirely new process of economic 
growth (in contrast to mere economic expansion). Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 provide 
snapshots of the new economic performance of Australia since 1788.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the fastest rate of expansion – measured by real 
Gross Community Income (market plus household income) and GDP – was achieved 
before 1860, when the vast resources of Australia were being integrated into the 
British dynamic strategy of industrial technological change. While the economic base 
was small in the early nineteenth century, the initial difficulties in constructing a new 
technological dynamic system in an isolated continent like Australia were large, and 
so this achievement was impressive. This was particularly true between 1830 and 
1850 when economic expansion based on wool production was about as rapid as that 
achieved during the gold rushes of the 1850s. By 1860 Australia’s natural resources 
had been fully utilised using the pioneering labour-intensive technology, and further 
expansion required a more capital-intensive approach. This fundamental change in 
dynamic strategy from family multiplication to technological change is dramatically 
reflected in the ‘kink’ in the household-formation curve (Figure 3) around 1860. This 
curve can be thought of as an index of economic expansion, which is the outcome of   7
family multiplication. Australia’s economic performance, therefore, can be viewed in 
terms of what happened before and after the critical year of 1860. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------- 
Between 1860 and 1890, development depended on a large inflow of British 
capital as Australia played the role of raw-material supplier to Britain’s 
industrialisation strategy. During this period, the rate of Australian expansion slowed 
considerably. And it slowed even more during the ‘interdepression’ years of 1890 to 
1939. This was a period when the new dynamic system was subjected to severe 
shocks – two major depressions, a major drought, and a world war. Only in the 
generation (1946 to 1974) after the Second World War – which stimulated the more 
industrialised Australian economy in a way that the First World War had failed to do 
– were rates of expansion comparable to those in the second half of the nineteenth 
century reattained. But, after the mid 1970s, these rates were halved again, and they 
only recovered modestly between 1990 and 2007.  
As economic expansion is closely associated with family formation, it is 
revealing to outline the longrun interaction between the household and market sectors 
using my ‘Total Income’ estimates (Snooks 1994: chpts 7–9). Figure 2 shows the 
changing relative importance of these two sectors over the past 200 years. Between 
1800 and 1861 the household sector grew (10.0 % pa) slightly more rapidly than the 
market sector (9.8 % pa). From 1861 to 1889 the market (4.7 % pa) and the household 
(4.6 % pa) increased at similar rates; but between 1889 and 1939 the household (2.2 
% pa) forged ahead of the market (1.8 % pa). Once again, between 1946 and 1974 the 
household sector (5.9 % pa) increased more rapidly than the market sector (4.6 % pa); 
and only between 1974 and 1990 did the market (2.8 % pa) completely outstrip the 
household (1.3 % pa). Clearly the household played a greater role in economic 
development during periods of high immigration (1800–1860 and 1946–1974) and 
during extended periods of depression (the 1890s and 1930s). 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Traditionally, the long-run analysis of the Australian economy has been cast in 
terms of a two-sector model – the private and public sectors. But since the estimation 
of Gross Community Capital Formation (Snooks 1994: chpt 9), it has been possible to 
recast this in terms of a three-sector model – consisting of the household, private, and 
public sectors. This new model can, for the first time, demonstrate the changing 
relationship between economic expansion and economic growth. Since 1860 the 
dynamic process, as can be seen in Figure 4, has been dominated by these three 
approximately equal sectors. Over this century-and-a-half, there were three distinct 
phases of about 40 to 50 years in this sectoral process. The household sector 
dominated during the second half of the nineteenth century, when population grew at 
the rapid rate of 3.4 % pa; the public sector took the lead during the retarded 
development of the inter-depression years, when the rate of population growth more 
than halved to 1.6 % pa and the private sector was under siege; and the private sector 
surged ahead during the ‘golden era’ and beyond. As we will see, these changes were 
driven by the dynamic strategies being pursued, and by the impact of external shocks. 
 
Estimates of economic growth – real GCI per household and real GDP per 
capita – tell a different story to those of economic expansion. Figure 1 clearly shows   8
that the process of economic development after 1860 (the era of technological 
strategies) was much more effective in generating economic growth than it was before 
that watershed year (the era of the family-multiplication strategy). At a more detailed 
level, Table 1 suggests that over the two centuries following 1800, real GDP per 
capita increased, on average, at the modest rate of 1.25 % pa. The periods of most 
rapid and sustained growth were: 1861 to 1889 (1.34 % pa); 1946 to 1974 (2.95 % 
pa), and 1990 to 2007 (1.95 % pa). It is interesting to discover the length of time it has 
taken for real GDP per capita to double, and double again, since 1800. The first 
doubling, by 1875, took 75 years; the second, by 1950, also took 75 years; the third, 
by 1974, took merely 24 years – only one-third as long as previously; and the fourth, 
at the current rate of growth (the average for 2002/03 to 2006/07), will not occur until 
2016, taking a much less impressive 42 years – 75 percent longer than in the golden 
era. There are a number of interesting implications here. First, the generation that 
grew up after the Second World War – the ‘baby-boomers’ – experienced a much 
faster rate of increase of prosperity than any other generation in Australia’s entire 
history. Second, while recent governments like to claim that they have presided over a 
golden era of prosperity, it pales in comparison with the post-World War II years. Not 
only is the current period of sustained economic growth actually slower, it is only half 
as long; and even the rate of economic expansion is much slower than this earlier 
period of development. And as we shall see below, our current prosperity has been 
expensively purchased. The period of the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, therefore, is 
the only truly golden era of Australian prosperity, despite the current myth about the 
past decade created by opportunistic politicians and incorrectly informed media 
commentators.  
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
These three periods of rapid economic growth stand out against a wider 
background of slow growth, stagnation, and even negative growth. The period 1800 to 
1861 was characterised by slow growth in per capita terms (0.7 % pa), and even 
negative growth in per household terms (minus 0.6 % pa) – and this despite the 
resource bonanza (gold) of the 1850s. But, of course, this was the pioneering period of 
British settlement, when new strategists were struggling to bring Australia’s natural 
resources into a new dynamic system. In contrast, the interdepression years were a 
great disappointment: 1889 to 1939 was a period of marked instability and very slow 
growth in per capita terms (0.1 % pa) and even negative growth in per household 
terms (minus 0.2 % pa). While there were small tentative advances from 1904 to 1914 
and again from 1920 to 1925, they were followed by marked retreats during the First 
World War and the Great depression. This poor performance, which is explained 
below, is also reflected in other time series, such as market and household capital 
formation (Figure 4), and population growth (Table 1). And finally, the more recent 
period 1974 to 1990 was also marked by slower growth (1.1 % pa), which was only 
one-third that of the post-war boom. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
Some economic historians have unsuccessfully attempted to revive the status 
of the period from 1889 to 1939 (McLean and Pincus 1983), particularly in relation to 
the second half of the nineteenth century. The above figures, even allowing for the 
argument that Butlin may have overestimated growth from 1861 to 1889 and   9
underestimated it from 1889 to 1939 (Haig 2001), can hardly be used to rehabilitate 
the interdepression years. This is not to say that the quality of life did not improve 
during this period. Various indicators of the quality of life, such as mortality, 
morbidity, and leisure do show a significant improvement, as a result of global 
changes in medical technology and practices (Snooks 1981; McLean and Pincus 1983; 
Snooks 1995). It is important, however, to emphasise the fact that the acquisition of 
material goods and services did not much improve, because it is the command over 
these that gives human society the resilience to survive and prosper in the longrun. In 
the past, societies that have failed to achieve ‘economic resilience’ – failed to compete 
successfully in the race for economic power – have not prospered, even not survived 
(Snooks 1996; 1997; 2003). Economic resilience is the prime objective of all 
societies, while the acquisition of non-material gains is secondary, albeit important. 
The tragic Australian confrontation of 1788 is merely one local example of this truth. 
The contrast between our measures of economic expansion and economic 
growth are informative. Interestingly, the rapid expansion prior to 1861 (9.9 % pa) 
was not translated into rapid and sustained economic growth (0.6 % pa). Why? 
Because this was a period dominated by the construction of a dynamic system that 
could facilitate the exploitation of Australia’s vast reserves of natural resources, rather 
than a system that could generate economic productivity. While the period 1861 to 
1889 experienced a slower rate of expansion (4.8 % pa), it enjoyed a higher rate of 
growth (1.3 % pa) than the previous half-century. The great achievement of the 
generation after the Second World War (1946–1974) was, as we have seen, to 
translate the rapid expansion (5.1 % pa) into much higher rates of economic growth 
(3.0 % pa). Since then, the Australian dynamic system has been less successful: from 
1974 to 1990, expansion was down by a half (2.4 % pa), while growth was down by 
two-thirds (1.1 % pa); and from 1990 to 2007, expansion recovered to only 63 
percent, and growth to only 66 percent, of the ‘golden-age’ benchmarks. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
The growth-rate implications of these estimates are compared in Table 2 with 
those by Butlin, Haig, and Maddison (who relies on Butlin for 1800–1911, and Haig 
for 1911 to 1939). Despite Haig’s important criticisms and alternative estimates, 
Butlin’s current price estimates stand up reasonably well, because they are the 
outcome of a masterly historian’s craft and intuition. Interestingly, Butlin’s current 
price series are still employed in ABS publications on longrun sectoral change. 
Anyway, the comparison in Table 2 shows that, for the analytical sub-periods I have 
employed, the differences between the alternative estimates of real GDP on the one 
hand and my real GCI estimates on the other are quite modest and do not affect the 
interpretation in this essay. The lesson here is that historical national accounts should 
only be employed for longrun, rather than year-to-year, analysis. 
 
4. Interpreting the Australian Dynamic 
 
Australian economic performance for the past two centuries should be seen as the 
outcome of strategic choices made by households in the Total Economy between 
dynamic equilibrium, economic expansion, and higher levels of household 
consumption that can be achieved through economic growth. Where governments 
exist, they do so only to facilitate these choices. Viewed from this perspective, five 
phases of economic development can be identified for the past two centuries. The first   10
phase, from 1788 to the 1850s, was characterised by economic expansion – the 
strategy of family-multiplication – as British settlers attempted to utilise Australia’s 
natural resources by employing the technology of the Industrial Revolution rather than 
that of the Palaeolithic Revolution (1.9 myrs ago) as had the first Australians. The 
second phase from the 1850s to the 1890s was more complex, involving the attempt to 
exploit these natural resources more intensively and to use the surpluses generated 
thereby to finance economic expansion (household formation) in urban areas at an 
increasingly higher standard of living. The third phase, from the 1890s to the 1940s, 
saw a relatively high rate of growth of household formation (higher than population 
growth) in a period of declining real market income per household through 
protectionist policies, together with some limited opportunities for the more intensive 
use of natural resources through technological change. The fourth phase from the 
1940s to the 1970s – the ‘golden era’ – was characterised by high rates of economic 
growth as the world economy expanded rapidly (Maddison 2001; 2003), together with 
the increasing use of surpluses to fund household consumption at the expense of 
family formation (average family size declined from 4 to 3 people). And the fifth 
phase, of slower growth since the 1970s is characterised by a return to the dynamic 
strategy of the late nineteenth century, of dismantling the framework of both 
protection and government enterprise, and relying upon exogenous demand rather 
than investing in the infrastructure of a new self-sustaining dynamic. The rest of the 
essay will focus on these five development phases. 
  The interpretation provided here is novel in a number of respects. First, it is 
the only account of Australian economic dynamics based on a general dynamic theory 
– particularly one that is both endogenous and demand oriented. Second, it is the only 
analysis that employs statistical estimates of Australia’s Total Economy, comprising 
the market and household sectors. Third, unlike earlier work, it emphasises the central 
role of technological change. In contrast, the interpretations of Coghlan (1918), Shann 
(1930), Butlin (1964), and Sinclair (1976) are based largely on quantitative 
descriptions of the outcomes of applying increasing quantities of capital and labour to 
the given stock of Australian natural resources. Their accounts have varied within this 
basic framework according to the preoccupations of the economics discipline of their 
day: Coghlan was influenced by the population and capital models of the classical 
school; Shann by the neoclassical concern with efficiency of markets; Butlin by 
simple Schumpeterian-Harrodian growth models; and Sinclair by the neoclassical 
synthesis. As none employed a general dynamic theory, they were unable to come to 
grips with the underlying dynamic mechanism, or to see where Australia might be 
headed. 
 
4.1 The 1780s–1850s 
 
To the European eye, conditioned by an entirely different technology, material living 
standard, and experience of economic change (which had long include growth as well 
as expansion), Australian natural resources in 1788 seemed not just underutilised, but 
even unutilised. They believed that the way to bring these resources into productive 
use was by the pursuit of the dynamic strategy of family-multiplication within the 
context of British industrial technology. Hence, the seven decades that followed, 
constituted a period of very rapid economic expansion, as the number of European 
households spread throughout that part of the continent that was amenable to the new 
foreign technology. In the process, Australia was integrated into the western European 
industrial system through the import of factors of production (capital and labour) and   11
the export of staples (wool and gold) demanded by European industrialisation. By the 
1850s a European-dependent dynamic system had completely displaced the long-
established Aboriginal system, and the European population had just exceeded the 
1788 Aboriginal population of about a million people (Snooks 1994: chpt 6; Butlin 
1986: 112–13). 
The dynamic of this formative period of European society was the outcome of 
a process of economic expansion based on an ‘extensive’ use of natural resources, 
rather than economic growth based on an ‘intensive’ usage. As shown in Table 1, the 
growth of real income per household was actually negative, and it was not until 1861 
that it finally turned positive. This was a time of very rapid household multiplication 
(almost 11 % pa), being twice as rapid as that for the entire two centuries, and greater 
than that in the second half of the nineteenth century by a factor of 3.7. The 
remarkable kink in the growth of household formation around 1860 (Figure 3) is a 
reflection of this change from extensive to intensive resource exploitation. This shift 
was an outcome of the exhaustion of the substrategy of family-multiplication 
(reflected in declining marginal strategic returns) and its replacement with a new 
dynamic substrategy. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the household sector 
grew more rapidly than the market sector; or that the small emerging market sector 
(dealing largely in wool) experienced the well-known capitalist pattern of boom 
(1820s and 1830s) and bust (1840s).  
 
4.2 The 1850s–1890s 
 
The achievement of this period was considerable, involving the large-scale application 
of a new rural, urban, transport, and communications technology to resources that had 
already been brought into the European dynamic system. And the colonial 
governments played a leading strategic role, directly contributing 38 percent of total 
market capital formation from 1861 to 1889. For the first time in Australian history – 
a history that stretches back in time for a century of millennia – technological change 
rather than family multiplication was driving economic development. But, it was 
technological change generated within the British dynamic system. It was, what I call, 
the ‘dependent technological substrategy’. Not only did economic expansion (increase 
in household numbers) proceed fairly rapidly but, for the first time, economic growth 
(increase in GCI per household) occurred in a rapid and sustained fashion. Indeed, the 
rate of economic growth achieved in this period was not exceeded until after the 
Second World War some three generations later. 
  The dominating feature of the second half of the nineteenth century was the 
large inflow of population and capital from Europe, largely the UK, which, combined 
with a new industrial technology, greatly increased the intensity of natural-resource 
use in Australia. During this period, population, which increased by a factor of eight, 
fuelled the rapid expansion of Australian cities. Indeed, one of the main achievements 
of this half-century, was Australia’s ability not only to retain the gold-rush population 
after the alluvial gold had been worked out, but also to absorb a large annual inflow 
during the three decades prior to the depression of the 1890s, and to house them at a 
relatively high and increasing standard. This achievement was based on the ability of 
the new Australian dynamic process to generate a level of average household income, 
a distribution of that income, a range of urban employment, a standard of public 
utilities, and a quality of residential living that made Australia attractive – despite the 
economic and social costs of global isolation – to a growing number of European 
families that were shedding the restrictions of traditional economy and society.   12
  It was, in other words, based on a new technological dynamic process. This 
interpretation, first presented in the early 1990s (Snooks 1994), came as a shock to 
those brought up in the tradition of Coghlan (1918), Shann (1930), and Butlin (1964) 
– a tradition that focuses on changes in the factors of production (capital, labour, and 
land) and ignores the role of technological change and, particularly, how it formed the 
basis of the new Australian dynamic system after 1860 (see Forster 1970; Boehm 
1971; Sinclair 1976; McLean and Maddock 1987). In fact, the Australian quantitative 
tradition has totally ignored the implicit model driving Australian economic 
development. This was encouraged by the influential but simplistic Harrodian and 
neoclassical ‘growth’ models, which focus exclusively on the role of physical 
investment. In this theoretical environment it is perhaps not surprising that Noel 
Butlin’s magnum opus on Australian economic development in the second half of the 
nineteenth century is called Investment [rather than ‘technological change’] in 
Australian Economic Development (1964). Of course, these deductive models are not 
at all useful for the reconstruction of real-world growth processes, as they are not 
about long-run economic growth at all, but rather about convergence to, or deviation 
from, equilibrium. Since this new interpretation of the early 1990s, Gary Magee 
(2000) has undertaken important work on technological change and economic growth 
in colonial Australia. 
  The dynamic-strategy theory also provides a new interpretation of the long 
boom and bust of the second half of the nineteenth century. Traditionally the 
fluctuating fortunes of this period have been accounted for in terms of the rise and fall 
of export prices for Australian staple products (Shann 1930; Boehm 1971). Butlin, 
following line of enquiry in Coghlan (1918) and adopting the theoretical approach of 
Schumpeter (1912), analysed this process in terms of a long-term deviation from and 
convergence to equilibrium, with export prices merely reinforcing this endogenous 
process. In contrast, the dynamic-strategy theory dispenses with the essentially 
thermodynamic concept of disturbances around the equilibrium state, in favour of an 
entirely dynamic concept (of a far-from-equilibrium type) of long waves of expansion 
and contraction generated by the exploitation and exhaustion of dynamic strategies (or 
substrategies) rather than resources. The end of the long boom in the second half of 
the nineteenth century came with the exhaustion of the ‘dependent technological 
substrategy’ – at the stage when the capital-intensive exploitation of Australian land 
resources was at an end – and the subsequent collapse was the outcome of difficulties 
in developing a viable, new dynamic substrategy. Export prices complicated this 
transition process, but did not drive it. It was not a result of over-investment in leading 
industries and ‘structural disequilibrium’, as Butlin argues, but of strategic exhaustion 
– of declining marginal strategic returns. Recovery required not a return to 
Schumpeterian equilibrium, but the development of a new dynamic substrategy that 
would drive the next wave of prosperity. 
 
4.3 The 1890s–1940s 
 
This phase of Australian development was marked primarily by a relative transfer of 
resources from the rural to the urban sector owing to government policies of 
protection and import replacement. From the late 1880s to the late 1930s, the 
manufacturing sector’s share of GDP increased from 11 to 18 percent, the rural 
sector’s share declined from 23 to 20 percent, and services fluctuated around a flat 
trend of about 30 percent. Of lesser significance was a technologically, and sometimes 
publicly, led transfer within the rural sector from pastoral to arable farming (Snooks   13
1974). This was the beginning of what I call the ‘paternalistic technological 
substrategy’, which eventually emerged, in the early years of the twentieth century, to 
replace the earlier ‘dependent technological substrategy’. Until it did, no further 
longrun growth was possible. The new substrategy was pursued until the early 1970s, 
with increasingly successful outcomes, until it too experienced diminishing marginal 
strategic returns. It was in this period that Australia’s population increased from 3.2 
million to 7.6 million, and the number of households, largely urban, increased from 
0.6 to 1.9 million (Snooks 1994: 202). 
  The retarded market development of this period was largely an outcome of a 
transition between two means of generating economic growth – the traditional 
reliance on the export of commodities produced from the increasingly intensive 
exploitation of natural resources, and a government-led shift of attention from natural 
resource exploitation to urban innovation through tariff protection. The specific 
reasons for this retarded market development (with the public and household sectors 
being more resilient) were: first, external demand for primary products did not grow 
as rapidly or as persistently after the 1890s as it did before, even collapsing in the 
early 1930s; second, the scale of the Australian economy was not yet great enough for 
the generation of endogenous self-sustained economic growth in the larger urban 
areas that would be required to off-set the costs of a major, if relative, shift of 
resources from high-productivity rural industries to lower-productivity urban 
industries. Hence, GDP per capita grew more slowly than might otherwise have been 
expected. These dynamic arguments and consequences were totally overlooked by the 
simplistic comparative-static and marginal analysis of Brigden (1929) and Samuelson 
(1939). 
  Immigration, although still important at times during the inter-depression 
period (in the 1900s, 1910s, and first half of the 1920s), did not play its former 
starring role, despite being publicly assisted. Population grew at only half the rate (1.6 
% pa) of that (3.4 % pa) in the previous period following the gold rushes. The market 
economy was unable to provide the opportunities for a continuous and rapid inflow of 
population during a period in which: sound natural resource margins had been 
exceeded; foreign trade was no longer an effective engine of growth owing to the 
precariousness of the world economy; ‘protection all round’ raised the costs of trade 
with the rest of the world; and economic expansion was badly punctuated by a series 
of major wars, depressions, recessions, and droughts (Schedvin 1970; Snooks 1974; 
Sinclair 1976). And as the market sector was unable to provide opportunities for a 
much larger population, the feed-back effects from the household economy to the 
private sector – especially via residential construction – were much less than in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the household sector did expand 
more rapidly than the private sector owing to its own internal dynamics (family 
formation) and to its close association with the public sector (particularly assisted 
immigration and urban infrastructure), and it did act to dampen the effects of severe 
downturns in private enterprise. 
  The interdepression period, therefore, was one of less-certain development. A 
less buoyant, and potentially vulnerable, international economy dampened the driving 
force in the private sector. By default, the public sector took the leading role in a 
process of economic change that was lacking in confidence and direction, and that 
was punctuated by economic and political crises. This developed into the 
‘paternalistic technological substrategy’, whereby the public sector took responsibility 
for encouraging immigration and, hence, the inflow of capital, through the stimulation 
of both rural and urban development. This was achieved by the provision of   14
infrastructure, financial grants, subsidies, and tariffs. During the period 1910 to 1939, 
public capital formation averaged 52 percent of the private and public total. Once 
again, it was this direct and indirect public activity that the household sector 
responded to and, in turn, stimulated. But at the same time, the internal dynamics of 
the household sector – the decisions to procreate and to change the structure of family 
organization – created a rate of expansion that defied an uncertain market economy. 
 
4.4 The 1940s–1970s 
 
The remarkable prosperity of this period was built upon the foundations laid during 
the interdepression years, and it was driven by the same ‘paternalistic technological 
substrategy’. The difference was that the scale of this strategy reached a level that 
enabled Australian society to reap the rewards of industrialisation, in the form of an 
unprecedentedly high rate of growth of real market income per household. While this 
was in part an outcome of a dramatic recovery of the international economy after the 
Second World War, which regenerated demand for the products of Australia’s natural 
resources (wheat, wool, animal products, and minerals), in larger part it was generated 
by a rapid growth of urban industries, fed on a rich diet of import quotas, tariffs, 
capital-intensive technology, and, most importantly, increasing returns to scale. 
Accordingly, manufacturing increased its share of GDP from 18 to 30 percent by the 
late 1950s and early 1960s (after which it declined to 25 percent by the period’s end 
as the strategy exhausted itself), the rural sector’s share declined dramatically from 20 
to 8 percent, and services’s share rose solidly from 30 to 36 percent. In the early-
1970s it seemed that Australia’s future prosperity would depend on urban 
technological change rather than on natural resource exploitation. But the exhaustion 
of the import-replacement strategy by the end of this period, meant that a new 
technological substrategy would have to be developed.  
  Owing to fundamental changes in the Australian economy during these years, 
the balance in the use of household income shifted dramatically away from family 
formation to the consumption of market goods and services. This was associated with 
the rush of females from the household to the market. In this remarkable transition, 
the proportion of female household workers who also held market jobs rose from 8.0 
percent in 1947 to 36.5 percent in 1990. This was a five-fold increase following a 
half-century of stagnation in the range of 5 to 7 percent. One implication for the 
market sector is that, while immigration supplied 1.6 million male workers in this 
period, the household sector supplied 2.1 million ‘married’ female workers (Snooks 
1994: chpts 4 & 5). This was an economic response by households to the unfolding 
dynamic strategy of industrial technological change not just in Australia but 
throughout Western society.  
  Fundamental technological change, involving the substitution of capital for 
labour on a large scale, began in the recovery from the Great Depression, accelerated 
during the Second World War, and finally spread widely throughout the economy of 
the ‘golden era’. This was associated with changing relative factor prices of capital 
and labour, and to changing patterns of consumer demand (Snooks 1994: chpt 5). 
Because of these fundamental changes in the dynamic system, developed countries, 
including Australia, generated a wider range of market occupations that suited the 
physical capabilities and technical training of female household workers. And, as a 
result of this outward shift in the demand for female labour, the relative wage rate of 
females to males increased by 69 percent (from 0.55 to 0.93) between the late 1930s 
(or, indeed, 1920s) and the 1970s. This major shift of market demand for female   15
labour – the first since the Industrial Revolution – enabled women to escape from the 
low-level wage trap that resulted not from widespread social discrimination but from 
the restricted range of employment categories in which females could, at that time, 
effectively compete with males. As I have shown elsewhere, it is possible 
econometrically to explain 98 percent of the increase in female participation in this 
period by reference solely to economic forces (Snooks 1994: 85–88). 
  This period also saw the emergence of the private market economy as the 
leading sector for the first time in Australian history. While the unusual buoyancy of 
the global economy was important, even more so were the fundamental technological 
and structural changes taking place in the private sector owing to the successful 
‘paternalistic technological substrategy’. While the public sector was content to play a 
less direct role in this new economic climate, it was still substantially involved in the 
development process through its protectionist and immigration policies. And it 
experimented with badly timed ‘Keynesian’ countercyclical policies (Cornish 1993). 
But by the early 1970s this strategy had finally run its course – the possibilities for 
import replacement had been exhausted and marginal strategic returns were falling 
significantly. 
 
4.5 The 1970s–2000s 
 
This latest development phase began with a move to replace the exhausted 
‘paternalistic technological substrategy’ with a more market-oriented one. It was 
recognised that, in this new economic climate, the dismantlement of the old 
framework of protection was essential, in order to promote greater efficiency and 
international competitiveness. This was the beginning of a wider effort to implement 
so-called ‘microeconomic reform’ in the commodity and factor markets. The hope 
was that the private sector would respond by developing new technologically based 
industries that could compete globally. In this way Australia would be able to 
replicate the high rates of economic growth and prosperity of the ‘golden era’. What 
they overlooked was the need for governments to invest heavily in the infrastructure 
of technological ideas and human skills, consequently the gap between private and 
public capital formation widened rapidly (Figure 4). The actual outcome, therefore, 
was not anticipated by policy makers or their economic advisers: namely, 
manufacturing’s share of GDP plummeted from 25 to 11 percent (back to the levels of 
the early 1900s), the rural sector’s share continued to decline from 8 to 4 percent, 
services increased strongly from 36 to 50 percent, and mining (reflecting the return to 
a dependency on staple exports) increased from 3 to 6 percent (back to the levels of 
the 1910s). 
This government-led movement, supported by key business leaders, was based 
on the static supply-side approach of neoclassical economics, rather than on a more 
realist demand-side dynamic approach. It was an approach that neglected both the 
pragmatic development role that Australian governments had always played, and the 
essential role of strategic leadership for government outlined earlier in the dynamic-
strategy model. According to this orthodox approach, it is enough to implement 
‘microeconomic reform’ by dismantling the old forms of regulation and protection 
and by selling off all remaining government businesses, because neoclassical 
economists tell us that the private sector will respond to the global challenge. Instead 
of being a first step in developing a new dynamic strategy, it was to be the only step. 
Instead of doing what governments of all successful societies (including Australia’s) 
in the past have done – providing strategic leadership by investing in the infrastructure   16
of new dynamic substrategies – recent Australian governments have used taxes 
together with receipts from asset sales to fund military adventures and extravagant 
election campaigns. Recent Australian governments, like recent governments in much 
of the Western world, have lost sight of the essential role of strategic leadership, for 
reasons discussed elsewhere (Snooks 2000: 81–88).  
Wiser governments in Australia would certainly have dismantled the 
framework of the exhausted ‘paternalistic technological substrategy’, sold off the old 
strategic businesses (in transport, communications, and utilities), but in addition – and 
this is the key point – they also would have used the sales receipts to invest in the 
infrastructure of science, technology, education, and work skills. An important current 
example is the solar energy industry. Despite the fact that Australia has long been – 
and continues to be (eg ANU’s ‘solar silver cells’) – a world leader in developing 
solar technology, other countries have invested in this Australian technology and are 
reaping the strategic returns.  Owing to a persistent and perverse lack of interest by 
the Australian government in supporting a local solar-energy industry, this country 
has missed out on massive strategic returns. Government support of projects of this 
type from the 1970s would have provided the strategic leadership required to develop 
a new dynamic substrategy based on cutting-edge technologies in which Australia has 
a comparative advantage. It would have given rise to a new, endogenously driven 
dynamic system. Instead, Australia has regressed to relying upon exogenous demand 
for our natural resources, particularly from China, to drive the Australian economy. 
Instead of pursuing an independent technological strategy that would have resulted in 
a viable endogenous dynamic system, Australia is relying on global demand for its 
natural resources to generate economic growth. This is a regression to the ‘dependent 
dynamic substrategy’ of the nineteenth century, which has resulted in uneven regional 
outcomes, with the resource-rich states, such as Western Australia and Queensland, 
growing rapidly and the other states falling behind. Essentially, there has been a 
failure of strategic leadership in Australia, particularly over the past decade, in favour 
of military adventurism. While the present government has given last-minute support 
to some alternative energy initiatives, it has the appearance of being a desperate 
attempt to retain government, rather than to the rediscovery of the vital role of 
strategic leadership. Hence, unless there is a major change in attitude to leadership, 
the response of Australian governments to the current energy problem is likely to be 
piece-meal, inadequate, and ephemeral. Since making this point earlier (Snooks 2000; 
2006), the ALP under Kevin Rudd has announced new policy initiatives about future 
investment in the infrastructure of technological change. Now that he is Australian 
Prime Minister, it will be interesting to discover whether these policies are effectively 
implemented. 
Compounding this strategic failure, Australia’s internal dynamic mechanism 
has been damaged by misconceived policies that target strategic inflation. This has 
reinforced the desire, and the need, to rely upon an exogenous driving force. When 
discussing the dynamic-strategy theory earlier, it was argued that strategic inflation is 
central to the operation of the strategic demand-response mechanism. This has been 
demonstrated empirically via the ‘growth-inflation curve’ for leading societies 
(Snooks 1998b: 141–59). Any persistent and long-term attempt to constrain the 
economy in order to keep strategic inflation within narrowly defined limits will 
distort this mechanism and, thereby, disrupt the endogenous dynamic system leading 
to economic stagnation and, even, downturn. During the early 1990s the Australian 
Treasurer Paul Keating told the electorate that this was ‘the recession we had to have’, 
because it was a necessary part of the process of ‘slaying the dragon of inflation’. This   17
tilting at dragons by any would-be Don Quixote seriously endangers the longrun 
growth process. Nonstrategic inflation, however, is a different matter. 
 Since the early 1990s, when it was widely argued that total inflation should be 
kept close to zero, there has been some indirect and pragmatic recognition of the 
dynamic-strategy type of argument: the total inflation target was increased to 3 % pa; 
then it was said to apply ‘over the course of the cycle’; and, more recently, it was 
applied not to total inflation but to ‘underlying’ inflation. While recently there has 
been a pragmatic recognition of the economic damage that inflation targeting can do, 
the orthodox theory that should underlie this (unheralded) change of policy – indeed 
the dynamic theory that should underlie the concept of inflation-targeting itself – is 
non-existent. Discussions by orthodox economists of the non-accelerating inflation 
rate of unemployment (NAIRU) are completely misplaced, because the core dynamic 
relationship involves growth and inflation – as reflected in the growth-inflation curve 
– not unemployment and inflation. The dynamic-strategy theory shows that inflation 
is not triggered by some clearly defined, threshold rate of unemployment, but is an 
outcome of the strategic demand-response mechanism discussed in section 2.4. 
Changes in unemployment, therefore, are merely outcomes of economic growth, not 
drivers of inflation. Hence, the current thrust of economic policy analysis completely 
misses the mark. We need to focus not on short-run statics, but on long-run dynamics.  
The truth is that inflation targeting is largely a theory-free, ad hoc policy initiative. 
And in pursuing it, the Reserve Bank is merely whistling in the dark. 
In addition, there are important practical problems with this type of monetary 
policy. First, the focus on ‘underlying’ inflation amounts to targeting strategic rather 
than nonstrategic inflation – the reverse of what is required to maximise longrun 
growth; second, it will adversely affect the essential work of small innovators – the 
‘strategic pioneers’ – who have limited access to development funds; third, as 
monetary policy can only be applied at the national level, it has amplified deflationary 
effects on any region experiencing a downturn while other regions are booming; 
fourth, it will exacerbate the effects of drought in rural areas; and finally, it generates 
equity problems through its impact on home mortgages, particularly when household 
debt is at historically high levels, as at present. These problems, which are 
exacerbated by the Reserve Bank’s irrational fixation with inflation, were not 
sufficient to prevent the re-emergence of the spectre of the ‘dragon slayer’ in the 
dying days of the Howard/Costello regime. And it is clear now that the Rudd/Swan 
concern is to fight a dogged “war on inflation” with fiscal as well as monetary 
weapons, in the face of growing social “pain”.  
Of course, a distinction must be made between strategic and nonstrategic 
inflation, and the latter must be kept under control, but not at the expense of badly 
needed technological infrastructure. The point to note here is that a systematic study 
of the past shows that no viable strategic society has ever been endangered by 
strategic inflation (Snooks 1997; 1998b; 2000). Accordingly, the policy of inflation 
targeting is both socially unacceptable and economically untenable. Not surprisingly, 
the loss of strategic leadership and the ideology of inflation-targeting have been 
responsible for Australia’s less impressive economic performance over the past few 
decades than that achieved during the ‘golden age’ of the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
5. What of the Future? 
 
The economic performance of Australia over the past two centuries has been 
dominated by the exploitation of natural resources. Initially this was achieved through   18
the dynamic strategy of family-multiplication, which was pursued for the first three 
generations of European settlement using a new technology generated during the 
course of the Industrial Revolution. During the second half of the nineteenth century 
Australia employed an even more capital-intensive technology to exploit its natural 
resources, largely in response to exogenous demand. Following Federation, an 
endogenously driven dynamic system based in urban areas finally emerged, as the 
result of government paternalism, and continued until its exhaustion in the early 
1970s. Since then the paternalistic system has been dismantled and Australia has 
reverted to exogenously driven natural-resource exploitation once more.  
  The traditional path being blindly followed by the present generation was 
chosen in preference to the more imaginative one of developing an endogenously 
driven technological strategy. To achieve the latter it would be necessary to invest 
heavily both in ideas-related infrastructure and in human capital, and to abandon the 
theory-free policy of inflation targeting that merely damages the strategic demand-
response mechanism of an endogenously driven dynamic system. Such a system will 
be essential in the future when China ceases to grow rapidly, when Australia exhausts 
its mineral resources, or when climate change challenges the traditional sources of 
export-driven growth. 
  What of the future? That should be seen as an outcome of the general dynamic 
system that has been identified as determining the past, rather than of extrapolated 
historical patterns. Assuming no unforseen crisis overtakes us in the next generation, 
as overtook Aboriginal society totally unexpectedly in January 1788 (see Snooks 
2006b), there are a few responses that can be made to this question by applying the 
dynamic-strategy model to Australian experience. It seems clear that Australia’s 
economic performance over the next generation will depend upon three key matters: 
the first depends on the growth trajectories of Japan, China, and India; the second on 
the impact of climatic change; and the third on whether Australian governments can 
rediscover the essential role of strategic leadership. Australia can do nothing to ensure 
the continued rapid growth of the global economy or to effect any change in climate, 
but it can ensure that we reduce our exposure to any adverse changes in these 
influences. This can be done, as I have suggested, by abandoning the damaging policy 
of inflation targeting, and by developing a technologically based, endogenously 
driven dynamic system. Such an innovative dynamic system would provide the 
flexibility to adapt to all forms of sudden global change. If Australia is able to achieve 
this, the next generation will experience rapid and sustained growth and prosperity; if 
not, the economic and political outcome could be much like it was during the retarded 
interdepression period.   
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TABLE 1 
AUSTRALIAN GROWTH RATES (CONSTANT PRICES), 1800-2007 
(% PA) 
 
  GDP  GDP per  GCI  GCI per  GCI per   Population  House- 
    capita    capita h/hold   holds 
1800–2007  5.42  1.25  na  na    na  4.11    na 
1800–1990  5.55  1.18  5.47  1.10    0.43  4.33    5.02 
1861–1990  3.50   1.39  3.40  1.33    0.93  2.08    2.44 
1946–1990  4.19  2.32  3.98  2.24    1.43  1.82    2.52 
1946–2007  3.99  2.26  na  na    na  1.69    na 
              
1800–1861 9.89  0.70  9.87  0.61  –0.63  9.13  10.56 
1861–1889  4.76  1.34  4.60  1.24    1.73  3.38    2.84 
1889–1939  1.75  0.11  1.99  0.30  –0.24  1.64    2.24 
1939–1946  5.06  4.14  3.50  2.62    2.44  0.89    0.90 
1946–1974  5.08  2.95  4.81  2.94    2.07  2.07    2.69 
1974–1990  2.44  1.12  2.34  0.93    0.26  1.38    2.08 
1990–2007  3.22  1.95  na  na    na  1.25    na 
1974–2007  2.91  1.58  na  na    na  1.31    na 
              
Note: GCI = Gross Community Income = market (private + public) + household income. See 
Snooks (1994) for definitions and detailed estimates. 
Sources: 1800–1990: Snooks (1994: 24); 1990–2007: calculated from Australian National Accounts 






RATES OF AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC EXPANSION (% PA), 1861–1939: 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES 
     
 
Notes: Maddison adopts Butlin’s current price estimates for 1861–1911, and Haig’s quantity-
based estimates for 1911–1939. Snooks’ real GCI is based on his detailed estimates of 
household income plus Butlin’s current price estimates of market income (minus any household 
items). Both Maddison and Snooks use alternative price series when deflating Butlin’s current 







  Real GDP    Real GCI 
  Butlin Haig  Maddison  Snooks 
  (1962) (2001) (2003) (1994) 
1861–1939 2.9  2.9  3.0  3.0 
1861–1889 4.9  4.1  4.8  4.6 
1889–1939 1.8  2.2  2.1  2.0 
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AUSTRALIAN GROSS COMMUNITY INCOME (GCI) BY SECTOR 
















































AUSTRALIAN TOTAL CAPITAL FORMATION BY SECTOR 


















SOURCE: SNOOKS (1994, p. 38) 
 